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Abstract This article presents a link between tariff rates and industry structure in a
dynamic setting. We examine the role of tariffs on final-goods in a firm’s decision to
integrate and collude in the presence of competitive imports. It is shown that, under
some conditions, the upstream firm has an incentive to engage in vertical integration
to introduce profitably a wholesale price above the world input price while not induc-
ing any intermediate or final good imports. Higher tariffs downstream, even with no
tariff protection upstream, make this strategy more profitable, and provide a rationale
for a positive relationship between tariff protection and vertical integration, which is
observed in some industries.
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1 Introduction
One of the fundamental issues in Economic Theory is how to determine the verti-
cal boundaries of the firm. Many theories have been put forward to explain what
drives vertical integration, although few of them have focused on how public policies,
in particular trade policy, affect firms’ incentives to integrate vertically. This paper
contributes to the existing literature by analyzing a potential channel by which tariff
policy may induce vertical integration. Specifically, we address the question of how
changes in the level of tariff protection downstream affect an upstream monopolist’s
incentives to integrate forward. We make use of a dynamic model that includes a
domestic upstream monopolist, a domestic downstream oligopoly and competitive
world markets for the upstream and downstream products. The upstream firm may
vertically integrate with one or several downstream firms thus gaining the ability to
operate in the downstream market. Forward vertical integration occurs for strategic
reasons, namely to create a mechanism that allows the upstream firm to discipline non-
integrated downstream firms and thus sustain more profitable collusion.1 However,
the organizational costs of the vertical structure, which are increasing in the number
of subsidiaries, impose a limit on vertical integration.
We find a non-decreasing relationship between the size of the tariff on imports of
the final product and the degree of vertical integration, measured as the number of
downstream firms the upstream firm acquires. Essentially, an import tariff imposes a
cap on the domestic final good price. Since we find that the optimal collusive price
of the final good increases with the number of downstream firms that are part of the
vertical structure, the upstream firm’s incentives to integrate increase with the tariff.
We also find that the vertical structure typically remains inactive in the output mar-
ket, and makes profits from sales of the input to non-integrated downstream firms
at a marked-up price. Hence, despite the existence of vertical integration, our model
predicts the prevalence of inter-firm over intra-firm transactions.2
Both recent empirical evidence and several cases of industries that have been ana-
lyzed in the Economic History literature are consistent with our main findings. In
particular, Alfaro et al. (2010) find firm-level evidence on the existence of a positive
1 For instance, according to Lamoreaux (1985), US Steel was able for some time to control independent
manufacturers of finished products by “holding up prices on raw materials and forcing down prices on
finished products”. The fact that US Steel was a vertically integrated firm meant that it was able to be an
active player in the downstream market, while being a potential supplier of raw materials to competitors of
its downstream divisions.
2 The existence of tariffs may affect intra-firm trade flows in vertically integrated industries. The Canadian
andMexican auto plants have extensive intra-firm linkswith their U.S. counterparts, mediated by large flows
of inputs across borders in the framework of the NAFTA agreement. However, in Brazil, which is protected
by common external tariffs under the Mercosur Trade Agreement, multinational auto manufacturers tend
to set up integrated production facilities that engage in relatively little international trade (see Hanson et al.
2005).
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relationship between tariff protection and vertical integration, based on a 2004 cross-
section of manufacturing firms from 101 countries. Webb (1980) discusses the case of
the early twentieth century German steel industry, whereas Mendi and Veszteg (2009)
analyze the case of the late nineteenth century Spanish steel industry. In the latter two
cases, an increase in the degree of vertical integration and the prevalence of collusive
arrangements were observed following an increase in tariff protection. On a theoret-
ical level, although in a setting different from ours, Ornelas and Turner (2008) focus
on the implications of contract incompleteness to show that lower tariffs on an input
prompt vertical multinational integration. Their model thus provides an explanation
for the observed rise in trade in intermediate goods within multinational firms.
Our contribution is threefold. Firstly, our main result is a contribution to the liter-
ature on the effects of trade policy in the presence of vertical relationships. Seminal
papers by Spencer and Jones (1991, 1992) have examined how trade policies affect
the decision of a potentially vertically integrated foreign firm to supply a domestic
intermediate-goodmarket. Since the foreign firm controls the exports of both the inter-
mediate and the final goods, it is able to react strategically to domestic trade policy
by altering its export combination, as in Spencer and Jones (1992). We show that
trade policies affect trade flows in an unexpected way. Higher tariffs in the final good
market foster vertical integration which in turn makes it feasible to implement a col-
lusive mechanism that affects trade flows. With integration, domestic purchases are
a substitute for imports of the input, since the upstream domestic firm services the
domestic market as a consequence of collusion.
Secondly, our model adds to the literature that studies how vertical integration
affects collusion.3 Specifically, it explains how vertical integration facilitates col-
lusion in the downstream market. The integrated firm is providing the input to the
domestic downstream industry and uses its subsidiaries as a credible threat to pun-
ish deviations.4 A contribution closely related to ours is Nocke and White (2007),
who have recently put forward the idea that vertical integration might facilitate price
agreements among upstream firms. Our paper differs fromNocke andWhite (2007) in
several respects. First, these authors deal with the facilitating effect of vertical integra-
tion on collusion upstream, whereas we consider a collusive mechanism implemented
in the downstreammarket. In their paper, both the upstream and downstream industries
are domestic oligopolies. In our case there is a world upstream competitive industry
which constitutes the alternative supply to the domestic downstream oligopoly. How-
ever, the vertical structure is able to service the domestic downstreammarket, reducing
to zero the market share of its upstream competitors, even in the absence of tariff pro-
tection upstream. Furthermore, the collusive behavior in Nocke and White (2007) is
just determined by the discount factor in the sense that either the monopoly price or
3 Several factors hinder collusion: asymmetries in costs and capacity, demand elasticity and demand fluc-
tuations, competition in non-price dimensions, barriers to entry, frequency of purchase, and multimarket
contact, to mention a few (see Feuerstein 2005, for a survey).
4 Levenstein and Suslow (2004) provide evidence on over forty contemporary international cartels pros-
ecuted by the United States or European Union in the 1990s. Most of them fixed prices on sophisticated
intermediate goods and services and 52% of them have had regional effects. Their industry sample includes
chemicals, transportation, steel, graphite and carbon, plastics and paper, and commodities like citric acid
and cement.
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monopoly output is implemented, if possible. In our case, for a non prohibitive tariff,
the tariff is precisely the highest collusive price that can be implemented.
Thirdly, our analysis is also related to the research that studies how tariffs affect col-
lusion. Our model shows that, although the input market is unprotected, higher tariffs
in the final good market imply higher collusion in the downstream market because a
non-prohibitive tariff imposes an upper limit on the collusive price. The basic reason is
that the collusive mechanism only includes the domestic industry at both the upstream
and the downstream levels.5
This paper is organized as follows: Sect. 2 describes the model. Section 3 analyzes
the relationship between collusion and tariff protection, for a given degree of verti-
cal integration. Section 4 discusses the relationship between integration and tariffs.
Section 5 presents some numerical examples to illustrate the results from the theoret-
ical model. Finally, Section 6 discusses a number of implications of our analysis and
presents some conclusions.
2 The model
We consider a domestic economywith two vertically related industries: one producing
an intermediate good and another one that transforms the intermediate good into the
final good on a one-to-one basis. There is a single upstream firm and N > 1 down-
stream firms that operate in the domestic economy. Domestic firms face perfect com-
petition from foreign producers in both vertically related industries. It is assumed that
the domestic intermediate good industry is unprotected while the final good industry is
protected by an import tariff, denoted by T . It is also assumed that both the upstream
firm and the foreign producers of the intermediate good have zero marginal costs.
Transformation costs are zero, and thus the downstream firms’ marginal costs are just
the price at which they purchase the intermediate good. Domestic downstream firms
compete in quantities. Domestic demand for the final product is p = a − bq where
a, b are positive constants.
In order to conveniently model the implementation of a collusive mechanism, we
propose a game with an infinite number of periods.6 In period t = 0, the import tariff
T is announced. Given the above assumptions on marginal costs and competition in
the final good market, T constitutes the upper bound on the domestic price of the final
product. Next and following the announcement of the tariff, the upstream firm chooses
the number of downstream firms to integrate with, M , giving rise to what we call the
vertical structure. Notice that in case of nonintegration, the upstream firm ends up
with zero profits. Given M , the vertical structure faces organizational costs φ(M) per
5 Previous work by Davidson (1984) shows that when tariffs are small the output reallocation derived from
cost asymmetry leads to an industry structure that is more conducive to collusion among home and foreign
oligopolistic firms. In contrast, Fung (1987) finds that a tariff may hinder collusion in a cartel of international
firms when home and foreign firms compete in each other’s market. Recently, Bond and Syropoulos (2005)
found that there is a non-monotonic relation between tariff levels and the sustainability of collusion.
6 Collusion arises from dynamic interaction. The ability to collude depends on the relative importance
of current profits compared to future profits in the firms’ objective function, as reflected by their discount
factor. Therefore, a repeated game is a suitable model to deal with these features.
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period, with φ(0) = 0 and φ′ > 0, φ′′ > 0.7 Beginning in period t = 1, the vertical
structure and the remaining downstream firms play an infinitely-repeated game with
the following stages in every period:
1. The vertical structure posts a collusive profile, which consists of a price for the
final product, a wholesale price, w ≥ 0, and an output level α > 0 for each of
the N − M non-integrated downstream firms.
2. Each non-integrated downstream firm decides on the amount of input to purchase
and whether to acquire it from the upstream monopolist and/or from the foreign
competitive industry. Payments for input purchased are realized.
3. Production takes place and firms collect revenues from sales of the final product.
We assume the use of Nash-reversion strategies, first proposed in Friedman (1971),
to sustain collusive outcomes. Notice that we have assumed that the vertical structure
has full bargaining power, since it is able to make take-it-or-leave-it offers to non-
integrated downstream firms. Positive wholesale prices will be used by the vertical
structure to extract profits from non-integrated downstream firms in a collusive out-
come.8 A feature of this collusive outcome is that, while the domestic input price is
set above the world price, no input is imported despite the absence of tariffs upstream.
3 Collusion and tariff protection
As is usual in studying this type of games, we will proceed backwards, analyzing the
final stage of the game first. Given the value of the tariff T , and once the number of
integrated downstream firms, M , is determined, the vertical structure will choose the
collusive arrangement that maximizes its profits subject to its own and the non-inte-






b − (N − M)α
] + wα(N − M)
subject to
(p − w)α ≥ (1 − δ)π Dn (p, w, α, N , M) + δπC (N )
p
( a−p
b − (N − M)α
) + (N − M)wα
≥ (1 − δ)π Dvs(w, α, N , M) + δMπC (N )
,
(1)
where the top constraint is the non-integrated firms’ incentive constraint, while the
bottom constraint is the vertical structure’s incentive constraint. In the constraints,
π Di (·) denotes single-period optimal deviation profits where the subscript i = n, vs
stands for non-integrated firms, n, or for the vertical structure, vs. Also πC (N ) de-
notes N−firm symmetric Cournot profits. First note that the vertical structure will
7 Convex integration costs arise due to agency costs that are increasing with the number of integrated
outlets, in a similar way to that described by Chemla (2003). Convex enough integration costs prevent the
equilibrium outcome from being the uninteresting case of full monopolization in all cases.
8 Mendi (2009) discusses the role of input sales as a mechanism to make side payments among vertically-
integrated, colluding firms with asymmetric costs.
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always adjust the wholesale price to make the non-integrated firms’ incentive con-
straints binding. Indeed, this condition will allow us to pin down the optimal value
of the wholesale price. Also note that the N−firm symmetric Cournot outcome can
always be sustained provided that the tariff exceeds the Cournot price and regardless
of the discount factor. We now proceed to discuss in detail the incentive constraints
that are part of the vertical structure’s problem, in order to obtain specific expressions
for the optimal deviation profits.
Non-Integrated Firms’ Incentive Constraint
In the collusive outcome, given p andw, each non-integrated firm produces a quan-
tityα. The vertical structure, which includes M integrated downstreamfirms, produces
a−p
b − (N − M)α, yielding an output price p. Every non-integrated downstream firm
thus faces the following incentive constraint:
(p − w)α ≥ (1 − δ)π Dn (p, w, α, N , M) + δπC (N ), (2)
where the LHS of the inequality are the per period profits if the non-integrated down-
stream firm agrees with the collusive mechanism proposed. The RHS are per-period
profits when it deviates. It consists of π Dn (p, w, α, N , M, ), which are optimal devia-
tion profits, plus the corresponding Cournot profits after reversion to the Nash equi-
librium outcome.
A non-integrated downstream firmmay deviate in two different ways. The first one
is prior to purchasing the input, implying the rejection of the terms offered by the
vertical structure. The second one is in the production stage implying that the non-
integrated firm procures α units of the input from the upstream firm at price w > 0
and then purchases some additional units in the world market at zero price. These
additional input purchases remain unobserved by the vertical structure and to the rest
of the non-integrated firms. We show in Appendix 1 that the deviation occurs in the
production stage. Intuitively, secretly expanding output shuns the instantaneous retal-
iation by the vertical structure. This allows us to write deviation output and profits
as
q Dn (p, w, α, N , M) =
p + bα
2b
; π Dn (p, w, α, N , M) = b
(
q Dn
)2 − wα. (3)
Substituting (3) into (2), and using the fact that non-integrated firms’ incentive




pα − (1 − δ) (p + bα)
2
4b
− δπC (N )
]
, (4)
which allows us to write the vertical structure’s objective function as:
πvs(p, α, N , M) = p a − p
b
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The Vertical Structure’s Incentive Constraint
Deviation by the vertical structure implies expanding its output once it has collected
revenues, if any, from sales of the input to the non-integrated downstream firms. Its





− (N − M)α
)
+ (N − M)wα ≥ (1 − δ)π Dvs(w, α, N , M) + δMπC (N ),
(6)
where the LHS is revenues from output sales plus input sales to non-integrated firms.
Recall that in the collusive arrangement, each of the (N − M) non-integrated firms
produces output α. The vertical structure’s deviation profits are
π Dvs(w, α, N , M) =
(a − b(N − M)α)2
4b
+ (N − M)wα. (7)
They consist of the profits from selling output in the final market plus the revenues
from the sale of its input since the vertical structure does collect them in case it devi-
ates from the collusive outcome. With this expression in hand, and using the fact that
the non-integrated downstream firms’ incentive constraints will always bind, we may




≥ 1 − δ
4b
[
(a − b(N − M )α)2 + (N − M)(p + bα)2
]
+ δNπC (N ). (8)
There are two cases that arise from the examination of this constraint, depending
on whether it is binding or not. As will be seen below, the vertical structure’s incentive
constraint will be binding for low realizations of the discount factor.
3.1 Optimal collusive outcome with a prohibitive tariff
We initially assume the existence of a prohibitive tariff, i.e. a tariff that would allow
downstream producers to set a price equal to the monopoly price without attracting
any imports of the final good, T ≥ pm . This guarantees that the vertical structure’s
pricing strategy is not constrained by the presence of the tariff. The optimal price is




p a−pb − (N − M) 1−δδ (p−bα)
2
4b
subject to p a−pb ≥ 1−δ4b
[
(a − b(N − M )α)2 + (N − M)(p + bα)2] + δNπC (N )
(9)
and, of course, the constraint p ≤ T will be non-binding.
Consider first the case where the vertical structure’s incentive constraint is non-
binding. There are two possibilities: either α = a−pb(N−M) , in which case the vertical
structure does not produce, or α < a−pb(N−M) . It follows from the first-order conditions
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of the vertical structure’s problem that the vertical structure finds it optimal to let
non-integrated outlets produce the whole output, at least whenever the output price
is high enough. This is because the vertical structure’s profits are increasing in α if
α ≤ pb . Thus, for prices p ≥ aN−M+1 , it follows that α = a−pb(N−M) , so that the vertical
structure is inactive in the output market and lets non-integrated firms produce the
whole output. If this is the case, then the optimal price is
p˜(δ, N , M) = a (N − M + 1) + δ(N − M − 1)
(N − M + 1)2 − δ(N − M − 1)2 . (10)
It is worth commenting that p˜(δ, N , M) is an increasing function of M and a
decreasing function of N for all 0 < δ < 1. It is also an increasing function of δ for all
0 < M < N − 1 and ranges from p˜(δ = 0, N , M) = aN−M+1 to p˜(δ = 1, N , M) =
pm .
An interesting special case is when M = N − 1 since p˜ = pm . Thus, when
the vertical structure incorporates all the downstream firms except one, the optimal
outcome in the presence of a prohibitive tariff would be that the non-integrated firm
produces the monopoly output, giving rise to the monopoly price. However, whenever
M < N − 1, the optimal price is strictly below pm for δ < 1. This contrasts with the
collusive arrangement in a symmetric N -firm oligopoly,9 where the monopoly price
is sustainable for some values of δ < 1.
There are two interesting implications from the vertical structure’s inaction in the
output market. The first one is that the wholesale price has to be positive. Sales of
the input at a marked-up price are the mechanism that the vertical structure uses to
implement side payments that compensate for its inaction in the output market.10 The
second is that the upstream firm sells the input to non-integrated firms and hence
intra-firm flows do not necessarily increase, although inter-firm trade in the input
will be affected. This result contradicts the classic observation that vertical inte-
gration will increase intra-firm flows, that is, trade among subsidiaries at different
stages.
Consider now the case corresponding to low realizations of the discount
factor where the vertical structure’s incentive constraint binds. The incentive con-
straint together with the first-order conditions of the vertical structure’s problem
determine the optimal values of p and α. Essentially, the vertical structure will set
the price that yields the highest profits conditional on the fulfilment of its incentive
constraint. It will first select α such that its incentive constraint is satisfied and for that
value of α it will then set the price that maximizes its profits.11 There are again two
possibilities: that the vertical structure produces in equilibrium and that it does
not. The latter case occurs when the discount factor is low enough. Appendix 2
9 The result that the optimal collusive price is typically below the monopoly price, is consistent with
empirical evidence in a number of industries as reported in Levenstein and Suslow (2006).
10 This result is in line with that presented in Mendi (2009), in the particular case of a symmetric-cost
downstream duopoly.
11 There is no closed-form solution for these variables, as they enter in a quadratic way in the constraint,
as well as in the expression that results from combining the first-order conditions of the problem.
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provides details on the calculation of the solution for low values of the discount
factor.
3.2 Optimal collusive outcome with a non-prohibitive tariff
Let us now analyze the vertical structure’s problem in the presence of a non-prohibitive
tariff, i.e. T < pm . Let p̂ = min { p˜, T } be the output price under the collusive arrange-
ment, where p˜ is the optimal price that was calculated in the previous subsection. The
industry output that sustains the price pˆ in the final product market is therefore a− pˆb .
The next result establishes how changes in the exogeneous tariff affect the collusive
outcome. In order to simplify the exposition, all proofswill be relegated toAppendix 3.
Proposition 1 There is a direct relationship between the tariff level and the discount
factor up to which the optimal collusive outcome is not modified. Furthermore, the
greater the number of integrated firms the smaller the set of discount factor values for
which the optimal collusive outcome is not disciplined by the tariff.
If p˜ > T , then the tariff imposes an upper bound on the pricing behavior of the ver-
tical structure. For instance, we argued in the previous subsection that if M = N − 1,
then the optimal price is pm , for a high enough value of the discount factor. Hence,
the introduction of a non-prohibitive tariff creates a binding constraint on the vertical
structure’s behavior. Moreover, with a non-prohibitive tariff and M = N − 1, the
vertical structure finds it optimal to produce some output under the collusive arrange-
ment. To generalize, let δ˜(N , M, T ) be the value of the discount factor such that
p˜(δ, N , M) = T . For values of the discount factor greater than this threshold, the
final good price is equal to the tariff. Since the optimal price p˜ is a non-decreasing
function of the number of integrated downstream firms and non-decreasing in the dis-
count factor, δ˜(N , M, T ) is non-increasing in the number of integrated firms M. Thus,
the existence of a non-prohibitive tariff might curb the vertical structure’s profits. This
effective constraint is more likely to arise the greater the number of downstream firms
integrated in the vertical structure. This is what yields the relationship between ver-
tical integration, collusion and tariffs. We present the basic result of the relationship
between tariff protection and the vertical structure’s choice of final good prices. The
next section explores how this modifies the vertical structure’s profit function, defined
in terms of the number of integrated outlets.
4 Integration and tariffs
In this section, we analyze the upstream firm’s choice of the number of firms to acquire
in the initial period of the game and how this choice is influenced by the tariff level in
the downstream industry. The upstream firm, when choosing the number of down-
stream firms to acquire, will compare gross profits with integration costs, which are
convex in the number of integrated outlets. We first study the vertical structure’s deci-
sion in the presence of a prohibitive tariff, and then analyze how a non-prohibitive
tariff influences its choice.
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4.1 Optimal integration with a prohibitive tariff
The analysis in the previous section allows us to construct the reduced-form gross (i.e.
excluding integration costs) profit function of the vertical structure, πvs(M, N , T, δ).
This function is non-decreasing in M, T, and δ. Obviously, for M = N the gross profit
equals the monopoly profit for every given value of the tariff, regardless of the value







. Additionally, for any M < N , when the
discount factor approaches one, the vertical structure is able to reduce non-integrated
firms’ profits to the Cournot level.
The vertical structure compares these gross profits with integration costs φ(M).
Recall that φ(0) = 0 and φ′ > 0, φ′′ > 0. With the gross profit function at hand, the
upstream firm’s decision in the initial period of the game is how many downstream
firms to acquire. Thus, the optimal number of outlets is determined by:
M∗ = argmax
M∈{0,...,N }
πvs(M, N , T, δ) − φ(M), (11)
taking into account that M∗ must be an integer. The functional form of φ will deter-
mine the number of outlets that are integrated. Convexity of this function makes the
upstream firm compare the benefit of integration with the increasing integration costs
of running more outlets. Since gross profits are increasing with the number of inte-
grated downstream firms, if the φ function is convex enough, the solution will be
interior, i.e. M∗ < N . The optimal M∗ is a maximum as long as the marginal gross
profits vary with the number of outlets by less than the increase in marginal integra-
tion costs. Another particular feature is that gross profits are non-decreasing in the
discount factor. Consider the case where the non-integrated firms produce the whole
output. Then the vertical structure profits are the industry profits minus the profits
left to non-integrated firms. Sustainable industry profits are always increasing with
the discount factor. Additionally, non-integrated firms’ profits are lower since their
incentive constraint is binding so they get the deviating profits which are decreasing
in δ. This explains the positive relationship between M∗ and δ.
4.2 Optimal integration with a non-prohibitive tariff
Finally we establish a link between tariff rates and the degree of vertical integration
in an industry. As already noted, the effect of a tariff on imports of the final product
is to set an upper bound on the sustainable domestic price for the final good. Con-
sequently, the maximum domestic price is merely the tariff. The level of the tariff
affects the upstream firm’s decision to integrate forward in the following way. If the
tariff is sufficiently low, so is the maximum sustainable price in the domestic market,
and the upstream firm will have little or no incentive to integrate forward, since it
would not be able to make enough profits that compensate for the integration costs.
For higher values of the tariff rate, the upstream firmmay choose to integrate forward,
but not to service non-integrated firms. If the tariff rate is high enough, the upstream
firm chooses to integrate forward, and service non-integrated firms. The reason why
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there is a range of values of the tariff rate that induces the upstream firm to integrate
forward, but not to sell the input to non-integrated firms, is that the vertical structure
would introduce a wholesale price too low to induce acceptance by non-integrated
firms. For this range of values of the tariff rate, the vertical structure is best off letting
its outlets behave like any other non-integrated firm.
Proposition 2 The equilibrium number of acquired downstream firms is non-decreas-
ing with the tariff level T, for T ∈ (pC , pm), and for sufficiently high realizations of
the discount factor.
This proposition establishes a non-decreasing relationship between tariff protec-
tion and vertical integration, given that the realization of the discount factor is high
enough. The optimal price increases with the number of integrated outlets and is non-
decreasing with the discount factor. This means that the higher M , the larger the set of
realizations of the discount factor for which a given non-prohibitive tariff T is binding.
Thus, increasing T means relaxing the constraint imposed on the vertical structure’s
pricing behavior over a range of values of the discount factor that is increasing with M .
Whenever the tariff constrains the vertical structure’s pricing strategy, a tariff raise ben-
efits the vertical structure more the greater the number of integrated firms. The reason
is that the vertical structure can set a higher price in a wider interval of δ either because
the optimal price is charged or because the constrained price is now at a higher tariff
level. In other words, the marginal gross profits of the vertical structure with respect to
the integrated outlets is increasing with the tariff level. Since integration costs are not
a function of the tariff, the equilibrium condition for M is now satisfied for a higher M.
Therefore this complementarity between tariffs and the number of integrated outlets is
the driving force in explaining why the optimal number of integrated outlets increases
with the tariff level. Finally, for lower values of the discount factor, since there is no
closed-form expression for the pricing function, the relationship cannot be proved,
although in the numerical examples that follow there is always a positive relationship
between tariffs and integration.
5 Numerical examples
We shall use a set of numerical examples to illustrate the previous discussion on the
optimal solution. In all cases, consider a = 50, b = 1 and N = 4. With these param-
eters, pm = 25, and πC (N ) = 100. All charts show the cases of vertical integration
with M = 1, 2, and 3. Integration costs are φ(M) = 40M2.
5.1 Wholesale and final product prices, prohibitive tariff
The first set of results presents optimal wholesale and final product prices for the
extreme case of a prohibitive tariff downstream. Figures 1 and 2 plot the posted market
price and wholesale price that will be observed in equilibrium, respectively. The case
of a prohibitive tariff allows us to highlight the fact that optimal prices are increasing
with the number of integrated outlets.
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Fig. 2 Posted wholesale prices, prohibitive tariff
Notice first that both output and wholesale prices are non-decreasing in the number
of integrated outlets. It is also interesting to notice that when M = N − 1, i.e. when
there is only one non-integrated outlet, it is optimal to set the price at the monopoly
level, for a high enough discount factor, in this case δ ≥ 0.41. Indeed, the vertical
structure would like to set the monopoly price for any value of the discount factor,
although when δ is low, it is forced to set a lower price and to produce some output
(to satisfy its own incentive constraint). When M < N − 1, notice that the optimal
price equals the monopoly price only when δ = 1. Hence, comparing these prices
with those in the standard symmetric collusive arrangement in an N -firm oligopoly,
we see that prices are indeed lower under vertical integration, at least for some range
of values of the discount factor. Finally, the changes in slope that are observed in the
pricing functions correspond to changes in the type of collusive arrangement chosen
by the vertical structure. For instance, when M = 2, the vertical structure’s constraint
is binding for δ ≤ 0.35. Thus for δ > 0.35, the solution is determined by p˜(δ, N , M),
as defined in (10), and the vertical structure does not produce in the optimal collusive
arrangement.
The wholesale prices are also increasing with the discount factor and with the
number of integrated outlets. When δ = 1, they are set to leave non-integrated firms
exactly with Cournot profits, provided that non-integrated firms produce the whole
output, and the optimal price reaches the monopoly level. When M = N − 1, the
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wholesale price is constant at w = 21 for δ ≥ 0.41, to leave the non-integrated firm
with Cournot profits.
5.2 The effect of tariffs on integration
So as to analyze the impact of tariff protection on the upstream firm’s decision on
whether to integrate forward and whether to service non-integrated firms, we consider
three realizations of the tariff rate, namely, T = 15, 20, and 25.The rest of the relevant
parameters take the same values as in the previous subsection.
First, Fig. 3 compares the net profits from vertical integration as a function of the
discount factor, should the firm decide to integrate with one, two, or three downstream
firmswhen T = 15. This represents the upper bound on the domestic price for the final
product. In this case, when δ ≥ 0.32, the upstream firm decides to integrate with only
one outlet, whereas it integrates with two outlets if the discount factor is below that
level. Integration with three outlets is unprofitable due to the convex organizational
costs, and also due to the existence of the tariff, which introduces an effective cap on
the output price for a wider range of values of the discount factor.
Now, if T = 20, notice that the critical value of the discount factor above which
integration with only one firm is optimal has increased to 0.75 (Fig. 4). Thus for values
































Fig. 4 Profits, T=20
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Fig. 5 Profits, T=25
downstream firm if T = 15, but with two downstream firms if T = 20. Of course,
this is due to the fact that a higher tariff relaxes the constraint on output prices for a
wider range of values of the discount factor if M = 2 than if M = 1. Notice also that
profits if M = 3 have increased relative to the previous case, although they are not
the optimal choice for any value of the discount factor. Finally, Fig. 5 displays profits
in the case of the minimum prohibitive tariff, T = 25. We observe that integration
with only one downstream firm is optimal only if δ ≥ 0.83, a threshold value that has
increased relative to the case T = 20. Note that collusion is always implemented in
our model. Then when δ is higher than 0.83, it implies a collusive situation with prices
close to monopoly. Interestingly, the integration decision of the vertical structure is
not affected by the tariff for those values of δ, that is, it will always integrate with one
downstream firm.
All these numerical examples illustrate a positive relation between tariffs and for-
ward integration: higher tariff rates induce a higher degree of vertical integration.
Even without tariff protection on the intermediate product, the upper bound on its
domestic price increases with tariff protection on the final product. Since the equilib-
rium price increases with the number of integrated outlets, raising the tariff rate on the
final product increases the likelihood that the upstream monopolist finds it optimal to
integrate with a larger number of downstream firms.
6 Concluding remarks
This paper has analyzed the impact of tariff protection downstream on the upstream
monopolist’s incentive to acquire downstream firms. The acquisition of additional out-
lets increases the vertical structure’s profits, although it also increases its integration
costs. In the presence of competitive imports, the effect of a tariff is to set an upper
bound on the domestic price for the final good. By acquiring downstream firms the ver-
tical structure is able to implement a collusivemechanism to non-integrated producers.
Since it is found that optimal collusive prices are increasing in the discount factor as
well as on the number outlets, raising tariffs makes it less likely that tariffs will impose
a constraint on prices and profits from integrating with more downstream firms. This
is the reason why there is a direct relationship between tariffs downstream and the
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number of downstream firms that an upstream monopolist is interested in acquiring.
This theoretical result is consistent with the empirical findings in Alfaro et al. (2010).
Furthermore, it is also proven that the optimal collusive price is typically below the
monopoly price, which is in accordance with the evidence reported in Levenstein and
Suslow (2006).
The literature on cartels has studied the role of cost asymmetries in limiting sustain-
ability of collusion. However, this result relates to a collusive mechanism established
among firms producing at the same stage in the production chain. The collusive mech-
anism we have studied takes place among firms at different stages. Consider then that
the domestic upstream firm enjoys a cost advantage over foreign rivals. In that case, a
deviating downstream firm would have to procure the input at the competitive world-
wide price which would now be higher as compared with the cost symmetry case.
Since the vertical structure profits are decreasing with the non-integrated firms profits
and the latter are the deviating profits, we might conclude that, for any given tariff,
a domestic cost advantage further facilitates vertical integration. The opposite would
hold for a cost disadvantage. This is an important issue since a testable implication
can be stated that relates upstream cost advantages and integration.
In our framework vertical integration has consequences on the input trade flows.
Without integration, the domestic downstream firms will basically purchase the input
in the world market.With integration, purchases substitute for imports of the input; the
upstream domestic firm services the domestic market as a consequence of collusion. It
is important to note that the logic of our paper remains valid had we assumed a foreign
upstream firm integrating with domestic downstream firms. However, this would now
imply no changes in trade flows as compared with non-integration.
Appendix 1: Optimal deviation profits for non-integrated firms
Consider first, that a non-integrated downstream firm deviates by purchasing the input
in the world market. We will refer to this deviation as D1. The vertical structure will,
in the deviation period, respond optimally to the downstream firm’s deviation, since it
observes whether non-integrated firms have purchased any amount of inputs from it.
If in the collusive outcome each of the N − M − 1 non-integrated downstream firms
produces α, the deviating firm and each one of the M integrated downstream firms
optimally produce and make single-period profits of:
q DD1(α, N , M) =
(a − b(N − M − 1)α)
b(2 + M) ; π
D





which are profits for an M + 1 oligopoly operating with zero marginal costs, taking
as given the production of the (N − M − 1) non-integrated downstream firms that do
not deviate. The subscript refers to the obvious notation. Notice that these profits are
decreasing with α.
Alternatively, a non-integrated downstream firm can deviate from the collusive out-
come by acquiring α units of the input from the upstream firm at price w > 0, and
then purchasing some additional units in the world market at zero price. We will refer
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to this deviation as D2. Recall that these additional purchases of input remain unob-
served to the vertical structure and to the rest of the non-integrated firms. If each of the
N − M non-integrated firms produces α, and hence the vertical structure, denoted by
subscript vs, produces qvs(p, α, N , M) = a−pb − (N − M)α, then a non-integrated
downstream firm’s optimal deviation output and profits are given by:
q DD2(p, w, α, N , M) =
p + bα
2b




Now, taking into account the fact that the vertical structure will always adjust the
value of the wholesale price to make non-integrated firms’ constraints binding, we
may write
π DD2(p, α, N , M) = πC (N ) +
(p − bα)2
4δb
which means that single period deviation profits are:
π Dn (p, α, N , M) = max
{
π DD1(α, N , M) =
(a−b(N−M−1)α)2
b(2 + M)2 , π
D
D2(p, α, N , M)





We need to compare both deviation profits. In order to do so, notice that, assum-
ing that the deviation occurs according to the second strategy, and that the vertical
structure’s incentive constraint is non-binding, the vertical structure’s profits will be
increasing with α as long as α ≤ pb . Thus, the vertical structure has an interest in max-
imizing the non-integrated firms’ share. However, it is also true that α cannot exceed
the level a−pb(N−M) , which is the level when the vertical structure does not produce at
all. Thus, the vertical structure remains inactive whenever p ≥ aN−M+1 .
If p ≥ aN−M+1 and hence α = aN−M+1 , notice that
π DD1(p, N , M) =
(a + p(N − M − 1))2
b(M + 2)2(N − M)2 and
π DD2(p, N , M) = πC (N ) +
(a + p(N − M + 1))2
4δb(N − M)2
and it is easy to see that π DD2(p, N , M) > π
D
D1(p, N , M). Similarly, if p <
a
N−M+1
and hence α = pb ,
π DD1(p, N , M) =
(a − p(N − M − 1))2
b(M + 2)2 and π
D
D2(p, N , M) = πC (N )
and again, π DD2(p, N , M) > π
D
D1(p, N , M). Therefore, π
D
n (p, α, N , M) = π DD2
(p, N , M).
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Whenever the vertical structure’s incentive constraint is not satisfied, which occurs
for low realizations of the discount factor, the relationship between α and p is qua-
dratic, which does not allow for the writing of a closed-form solution. In the numerical
examples, it will be verified that the optimal deviation in all cases will be D2.
Appendix 2: Optimal collusive price for low values of the discount factor
The vertical structure’s incentive constraint imposes lower and upper bounds on p˜ ∈




δ(a + (N − M − 1)p)2 − (a − (N − M + 1)p)2
4bδ(N − M)2 − π
C
)





which is the saturated vertical structure’s incentive constraint, under the assumption
of non-integrated downstream firms producing the whole output. These bounds exist
as long as δ is sufficiently large, δ > δˆ, where δˆ is the value of the discount factor
that equals the discriminant of the above quadratic equation to zero. Note that δˆ < δ˜,
where δ˜ is the value that equals p˜(δ˜) = p+(δ˜), and δ˜ ∈ (0, 1). Thus, the equilibrium
price is p˜ for all δ > δ˜. In contrast, when δ < δ˜ the vertical structure cannot set
the price equal to p˜ since it will not satisfy its incentive constraint. Thus, the vertical
structure selects first α such that the vertical structure’s incentive constraint is satisfied
and next obtains the price that maximizes its profits.
We first compute the α that satisfies the vertical structure’s incentive constraint,





− (N − M) α
)




(p + bα)2 − 4bπc) − (p − bα)2
4b
)




The above expression is a quadratic convex polynomial in α with the following
roots:
α+,− = a − p
b(N − M + 1)
±
√
(N−M)(1−δ)[δ(a−(N−M)p)2−(a − (N−M+2)p)2−4bN (N−M+1)δπC ]
b(N−M+1)(N−M)(1−δ)
Recall that the vertical structure’s profits are increasing with α as long as α ≤ pb .
For this reason, if pb ∈ [α−, α+], it is the chosen value of α. Otherwise, if pb > α+,
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then α = α+, and if pb < α−, then α = α−. However, it is true that the price will
be below aN−M+1 , which implies that the chosen α will always be below
p
b . To see
this, notice that even if non-integrated firms were to produce the whole output, i.e. if
α = a−pb(N−M) , this share is below pb . Then, α = α+and the vertical structure computes












p + bα+)2 − 4bπc
)




We denote by p′ the argmax of the above expression which is implicitly defined
by:
(




= 2δ(a − 2p)
(1 − δ)(p − bα+(p))
In the examples included in the text, the vertical structure’s optimal behavior for
0 < δ < δ˜ has been computed numerically, since no closed form solutions exist for
this case. The price that maximizes the vertical structure’s profits—and that, by con-
struction, satisfies both incentives constraints—has been obtained for every value of
the discount factor δ.
Appendix 3: Proof of Propositions 1 and 2
Proof of Proposition 1 The collusive price p˜(δ, N , M) is a non-decreasing function
of M and it falls into the [ aN−M+1 , pm] interval. Now, if pC < T < aN−M+1 , since
T < p˜(δ, N , M), the home industry is disciplined by the tariff for every value of the
discount factor δ. For these values of the tariff rate, the vertical structure produces a
positive amount of the final product in equilibrium. Second, if aN−M+1 < T < p
m ,
there is a threshold value of the discount factor δ˜(N , M, T ),which is implicitly defined
by p˜(N , M, δ) = T i.e. δ˜(N , M, T ) = (N−M+1)(T (N−M+1)−a)
(N−M−1)[T (N−M−1)+a] . This threshold value
is increasingwith T and N while decreasingwith M.Therefore, if δ ∈ (0, δ˜(N , M, T )]
then the equilibrium price is p˜(N , M, δ) while for δ ∈ (δ˜(N , M, T ), δ(N )) then the
tariff disciplines the downstream home market and the observed price is T . unionsq
Proof of Proposition 2 Suppose that the discount factor is high enough so that the
vertical structure’s incentive constraint is non-binding given a price p̂ = min { p˜, T }.
Then, for any tariff T < pm we can establish an ordering of the minimum discount
factors for which the tariff disciplines the behavior of the vertical structure, in the
sense that p̂ = min { p˜, T } = T . In particular,
0 = δ˜(N , N , T ) ≤ δ˜(N , N − 1, T ) ≤ δ˜(N , N − 2, T ) ≤ · · · ≤ δ˜(N , 1, T )
i.e. it is more likely that the tariff disciplines the vertical structure’s optimal behavior
the greater the number of integrated downstream firms.
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Now, if the tariff increases to, say T ′ > T , for every M the price—and profits
—increases for δ > δ˜(N , M, T ). Given the above ordering, the range of values for
which prices and profits increase after the tariff is raised decreases with M . In par-
ticular, for every M , there is an interval [˜δ(N , M, T ), δ˜(N , M − 1, T )] for which
profits increase if the number of integrated outlets is M , but not if it is M − 1. For
δ > δ˜(N , M − 1, T ), profits increase both for M − 1 and M , but more in the lat-
ter case because ∂πvs
∂ p̂ increases in M . To see this, notice that there are two possible
expressions for πvs . If the vertical structure does not produce at all, the price will be
given by p̂ = T and each non-integrated firm will produce α = a− p̂b(N−M) . In this case,




= (N − M)(a − 2 p̂)
bδ
− (1 − δ)(N − M − 1)
2bδ
(a + p(N − M − 1))
which is increasing with M . The other possibility is that the vertical structure pro-
duces a positive amount of the final good, and thus α = p̂b , which occurs whenever
p̂ < aN−M+1 . For instance, this is the case if M = N − 1 and the tariff T is non-
prohibitive. In this case, the expression for the partial derivative is
∂πvs
∂ p̂
= (N − M)(a − 2 p̂)
bδ
which turns out to be always greater than the previous expression. Hence, whenever
the tariff constraints the vertical structure’s pricing strategy, a tariff raise benefits the
vertical structure more the greater the number of integrated firms. unionsq
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